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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 VIENNA 3148

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: WESTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE PLENARY PRESENTATION TO BE MADE
BY THE US REP ON 9 APRIL. BEGIN TEXT.

FOR CONFERENCE USE

STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES APRIL 9, 1974

1. TODAY, AT THE LAST PLENARY SESSION BEFORE WE BREAK FOR
CONSULTATION WIT GOVERNMENTS, IT SEEMS APPROPRIATE AS OTHERS
ARE DOING TO TAKE A LOOK BACKWARD AT WHAT WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED
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IN THE PAST THREE MONTHS, AND A LOOK FORWARD AT THE TASK THAT

AWAITS US WHEN WE RETURN IN MAY. SO I SHOULD LIKE TODAY TO SUM UP THE VIEW OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS ON WHERE MATTERS NOW STAND, STARTING WITH A BRIEF REVIEW OF SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS.

2. AS AGREED LAST YEAR IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS, THE GOALS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS ARE TO CONTRIBUTE TO A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP AND TO THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE. IMPLICIT IN THIS AGREEMENT WAS THE MUTUAL RECOGNITION THAT STABILITY AND SECURITY STAND IN NEED OF IMPROVEMENT.

3. THERE IS NO NEED TO RECAPITULATE HERE THE SUBSTANCE OF THE WESTERN PROPOSALS. MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE DEVELOPED THEM FURTHER DURING THE MONTHS SINCE THEY WERE TABLED, ADDING SOME DETAILS AND PROVIDING CERTAIN CLARIFICATIONS. WE HAVE EXPLAINED FURTHER THE RATIONALE UNDERLYING OUR APPROACH. WE THINK, IN SHORT, THAT WE HAVE CONVINCINGLY DEMONSTRATED HOW OUR PROPOSALS WOULD REALIZE THE AGREED GOALS AND WHY, THEREFORE, THEY WOULD BE IN THE MUTUAL INTEREST.

4. THE PROPOSALS WE HAVE ADVANCED AIM AT ACHIEVING THESE AGREED GOALS THROUGH A MORE STABLE BALANCE BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES. THEY AIM AT MAKING A CHANGE FOR THE BETTER IN THE PRESENT UNSATISFACTORY SECURITY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE. SUCH A CHANGE WOULD CLEARLY BE IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL.

5. BY CONTRAST, THE EASTERN APPROACH WOULD PRESERVE THE EXISTING RATION BETWEEN THE FORCES OF EAST AND WEST. IN PARTICULAR, THE RATION OF GROUND FORCES ON THE EASTERN SIDE TO GROUND FORCES ON THE WESTERN SIDE WOULD REMAIN UNCHANGED. THUS, THE EXISTING EASTERN ADVANTAGE IN THESE FORCES WOULD BE PRESERVED.

6. THIS APPROACH DOES NOT IN OUR VIEW MEET THE PROBLEM WHICH THESE NEGOTIATIONS ARE INTENDED TO RESOLVE. IT WOULD NOT SERVE TO IMPROVE STABILITY AND SECURITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IT WOULD NOT CHANGE THINGS FOR THE BETTER. IT WOULD MERELY PERPETUATE THE PRESENT UNSATISFACTORY SITUATION. INDEED, IN PRACTICAL TERMS, IT WOULD ACTUALLY WORSEN IT, SINCE ON THE ALLIED SIDE THERE WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY FEWER TROOPS LEFT ON THE GROUND TO DEFEND THE EXISTING AND UNCHANGED LINE.
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7. THE WORK OF THE PAST THREE MONTHS HAS BEEN LARGELY EXPOSITORY AND EXPLORATORY IN CHARACTER. THIS HAS BEEN A NECESSARY AND USEFUL PROCESS, A NATURAL AND INDISPENSIBLE PART OF ANY NEGOTIATION. ESSENTIAL INFORMATION ON THE POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES HAS BEEN EXCHANGED. BOTH SIDES HAVE LEARNED A GOOD DEAL OF VALUABLE BACKGROUND WHICH WILL SERVE THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE FUTURE. BOTH SIDES WELCOME THE FACT THAT THE TONE OF THE DISCUSSIONS

CONTINUES TO BE BUSINESSLIKE AND CONTRRUCTIVE. MOREOVER,
PARTICIPANTS ARE DEMONSTRATING A SERIOUS INTEREST IN COMING
TO AN AGREEMENT, IF POSSIBLE THIS YEAR. WE BELIEVE THESE
POINTS AUGUR WELL FOR THE FUTURE WORK OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

8. AT THE SAME TIME, IT IS VERY CLEAR THAT PARTICIPANTS HAVE
A LONG WAY TO GO YET. THE MAIN TASKS FACING THE NEGOTIATIONS
HAVE NOT YET BEEN RESOLVED. NO AGREEMENT ON ANY ASPECT OF
THE SUBSTANCE, EVEN IN PRINCIPLE, HAS BEEN REACHED YET.
CLEARLY, CONTINUED PATIENCE AND PERSEVERANCE ON THE PART
OF ALL WILL BE REQUIRED. MUCH HARD WORK LIES AHEAD.

9. IF IS ONLY FAIR TO ADD THAT, WHILE THERE HAS BEEN NO
PROGRESS ON ACTUAL SUBSTANCE, THERE HAS BEEN A CERTAIN

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

DEGREE OF CLARIFICATION OF THE CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS USEFUL. IT IS AT LEAST A FIRST STEP TOWARDS DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH WE MAY BE ABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT. BUT THE TIME HAS NOW COME TO MOVE BEYOND EXPOSITION OF OUR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS. IT IS NECESSARY THAT WE NOW BEGIN ACTIVELY TO SEEK SPECIFIC AREAS OF AGREEMENT.

10. IN CONSIDERING HOW TO DO THIS, PARTICIPANTS WILL NATURALLY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE MAIN SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES THAT HAVE ARISEN IN DISCUSSIONS OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS. IN REGARD TO THESE ISSUES, WE BELIEVE THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD ASK THEMSELVES THIS QUESTION: TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD, WHAT ISSUE WOULD IT BE MOST PRODUCTIVE TO FOCUS ON FIRST?

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11. LET ME NOW DEFINE WHAT MY COLLEAGUES AND I SEE AS TWO MAIN SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES WHICH DIVIDE US AT PRESENT. THE FIRST OF THESE ISSUES: SHOULD THE PARTICIPANTS AIM AT AN INITIAL AGREEMENT TO REDUCE US AND SOVIET FORCES, DEFERRING REDUCTIONS BY OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO A SECOND PHASE, AS WE PROPOSE? OR SHOULD THE FORCES OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS BE REDUCED TOGETHER, FROM THE OUTSET?

12. I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS SOME OF THE MAIN POINTS MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE MADE IN THE PAST WEEKS WITH RESPECT TO THIS FIRST ISSUE. WE CONTINUE TO THINK THAT IT MAKES SENSE TO REDUCE US AND SOVIET FORCES FIRST. YOU ARE ALL FAMILIAR WITH THE MANY REASONS THIS IS SO. BUT LET ME CALL ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE SUGGESTED THAT WE SEEK PRACTICAL RESULTS BY 1975. WE ARE PREPARED TO TRY TO MEET THIS GOAL. IN THE LIGHT OF ALL WHICH HAS BEEN SAID IN THE LAST THREE MONTHS, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE WAY TO MEET THIS TIME GOAL IS TO FOCUS FIRST ON REDUCTIONS OF US-SOVIET GROUND FORCES.

13. TO AGREE ON REDUCTIONS BY THE US AND SOVIET UNION WOULD BE THE SIMPLEST, MOST DIRECT WAY. BUT TO ATTEMPT TO AGREE EVEN ON SMALL REDUCTIONS BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS FROM THE OUTSET WOULD CREATE ALL THE DIFFICULTIES MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE REPEATEDLY POINTED TO. SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS OF THESE FORCES ARE THEREFORE NOT THE ANSWER.

14. WE HAVE EXPLAINED WHY IT WOULD NOT BE FEASIBLE FOR OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. ONCE AGAIN, IT ISN'T NECESSARY TO REPEAT ALL OUR REASONS. THE CENTRAL POINT IS THIS: A REDUCTION AGREEMENT WOULD AFFECT ONLY A CERTAIN PORTION OF THE FORCES OF THE US AND OF THE USSR. BUT THE SITUATION OF THE OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IS QUITE DIFFERENT FOR REASONS EXPLAINED BY MY GERMAN COLLEAGUE IN HIS PRESENTATION ON APRIL 4. IN BRIEF THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS

OF CONFIDENCE MUST BE CREATED BEFORE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US COULD BE PREPARED TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES. THAT IS WHY WE HAVE SAID THAT THE WAY TO REDUCTION OF THE FORCES OF WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US LIES THROUGH PRIOR US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS.

15. NOW LET ME TURN TO THE SECOND ISSUE. IT IS WHAT KIND OF CONFIDENTIAL

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REDUCTIONS WOULD CONTRIBUTE MOST TOWARD REDUCING THE RISK OF AN OUTBREAK OF CONFLICT, WITH ITS ATTENDANT RISKS OF ESCALATION TO NUCLEAR WAR? SHOULD PARTICIPANTS AIM AT ACHIEVING AN EQUILIBRIUM THROUGH A COMMON CEILING IN GROUND FORCES AS WE PROPOSE, OR SHOULD ALL TYPES OF FORCES -- INCLUDING AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES -- BE REDUCED PROPORTIONALLY ACCORDS THE BOARD?

16. HERE, TOO, MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE MADE OUR POSITION CLEAR. THE CENTRAL POINT WE HAVE MADE IS THIS: THE WAY TO ENHANCE STABILITY AND THE WAY TO REDUCE THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF A CONFLICT THAT MIGHT LEAD TO NUCLEAR WAR IS TO ELIMINATE DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCES BY ESTABLISHING A COMMON CEILING FOR THESE FORCES.

17. REDUCING AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THESE ENDS. I SHOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT, IN MAKING OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND OF WHAT SHOULD BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT, WE HAVE NOT IGNORED AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES. FAR FROM IT. BUT THE POINT IS THAT REDUCTIONS OF AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES STATIONED WITHIN THE AREA WOULD NOT ELIMINATE THE PROBLEM OF INSTABILITY ARISING FROM THE LARGE DISPARITIES IN THE GROUND FORCE RELATIONSHIP. THAT IS WHY, TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM OF ENHANCING STABILITY AND REDUCING THE RISKS OF WAR, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WAR, WE MUST SEEK TO MAKE THE GROUND FORCE RELATIONSHIP MORE STABLE BY BRINGING IT INTO EQUILIBRIUM. REDUCTIONS OF AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES, WHETHER SMALL OR LARGE, WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THIS AIM.

18. MR. CHAIRMAN, WE HAVE NOT HAD A GOOD DEAL OF DISCUSSION OF THESE TWO ISSUES. THOUGH NEITHER SIDE HAS CHANGED ITS POSITION ON THE MAJOR ISSUES OF SUBSTANCE, VIEWPOINTS HAVE BEEN CLARIFIED. THE QUESTION NOW BEFORE US IS: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? HOW CAN WE MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD?

19. WE STARTED THESE NEGOTIATIONS LAST OCTOBER FROM A CERTAIN DEGREE OF COMMON GROUND SET FORTH IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF JUNE 28, 1973, ALTHOUGH THAT COMMON GROUND DOES NOT EXTEND

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FROM US REP MBFR

TO THE QUESTION OF HUNGARY. SINCE THEN, WE THINK THAT SOME AREAS OF FURTHER POSSIBLE COMMON GROUND MAY BE EMERGING WHICH CAN BE HELPFUL. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE, WE THINK, TO BUILD TOGETHER ON THESE POINTS IN THE FUTURE.

20. LET ME BRIEFLY REVIEW WHAT THEY ARE. FIRST, BOTH SIDES APPEAR TO AGREE ON THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE OF TAKING STEPS TO MAKE ANY CONFLICT LESS LIKELY, AND THUS ALSO REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT. SECOND, THERE MAY BE SOME COMMON GROUND WITH RESPECT TO PHASING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND REDUCTIONS. THIRD, WE HAVE NOTED THAT UNDER BOTH OF THE APPROACHES WHICH HAVE BEEN PUT FORWARD IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED. FOURTH, BOTH SIDES APPEAR TO AGREE ON THE CARDINAL IMPORTANCE OF STRENGTHENING THE SECURITY OF ALL NINETEEN PARTICIPANTS. IN THIS CONTEXT, THEY ALSO APPEAR TO AGREE THAT, AS A RESULT
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OF FORCE REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, TENSIONS SHOULD NOT BE SHIFTED TO THE FLANK COUNTRIES. REMARKDS MADE BY THE BULGARIAN REPRESENTATIVE ON APRIL 4 WITH RESPECT TO THIS POINT SUGGEST THE EXISTENCE OF COMMON GROUND HERE.

21. FINALLY, BOTH SIDES SEEM TO WISH TO COME TO PRACTICAL RESULTS IN THE MOST EXPEDITIOUS WAY. BOTH SIDES RECOGNIZE THAT THE PRIORITY PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED NOW IS THE PROBLEM OF WHAT SPECIFIC LIMITED STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN IN ORDER TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS AHEAD IN A PRACTICAL SENSE.

22. THIS MEANS REACHING A JOINT UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT IS COMMON IN THE APPROACHES OF BOTH SIDES AND SEEKING TO BUILD ON THIS COMMON GROUND FOR A SMALL FIRST STEP. IN THE PROCEDURAL SENSE, IT MEANS FOCUSING ON THE ISSUE LIKELY TO PROVE MOST PRODUCTIVE IN TERMS OF MOVING THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD. THIS COULD BE DONE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE POSITION OF EITHER SIDE.

23. MY COLLEAGUES AND I SUGGEST THAT THE RECESS WHICH IS BEFORE US CAN BEST BE USED TO REVIEW WHERE THE NEGOTIATIONS NOW STAND AND TO CONSIDER THE BEST PRACTICAL WAYS TO MOVE FORWARD TO REACH AN AGREEMENT BY THE END OF THIS YEAR. AFTER THE RECESS, WE WILL BE CONSIDERING TOGETHER HOW TO DO THIS. WE HOPE WHEN WE ALL COME BACK IN MAY THAT WE CAN GET DOWN TO THE PRACTICAL TASK OF WORKING OUT A JOINT UNDERSTANDING ON THIS NEXT STEP.
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